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POLISH CHURCHES FACE NEW ISSUES IN EARLY 1990 
By Bill Yoder 
THE IMPACT OF POLISH ECONOMICS 
Estimates on the rate of inflation in 1 989 in Poland, a country of 38 million range from 
600 to 1 ,000 percent. A Lutheran clergyman (there are no women pastors) earned 240,000 
zloty per month, but that sum was upped to 400,000. Yet the average Polish salary is 600,000 
zloty, or, $60 per month. That explains well why the citizens of western Poland regularly 
make 300-mile treks to West Berlin in order to earn $20 from the sale of contraband 
consumer items. 
The question is from where is the Protestant churches to generate this additional cash? 
Understandably, roaring inflation has dampened the capability of believers to donate. Jerzy 
Gryniakow, the portly and charming Lutheran rector of Warsaw's ecumenical "Christian 
Theological Academy," unabashedly suggests, "It would be good if each congregation found 
a (western) sponsor. That way, we could at least guarantee the pastor's salary." Poland has 
roughly 1 00 Lutheran pastors. 
The soaring costs of heating oil and coal have lead the Polish Ecumenical Council, which 
represents eight of Poland's 34 Christian denominations, to plead with the government to 
institute discount prices for the heating of church-owned buildings. Thanks to the costs of 
paper, the Lutheran monthly, Zwiastun, has shrunk to eight pages. In short: Polish 
Protestant churches are presently incapable of covering their day-to-day expenses. 
The government has agreed to return all church property expropriated (or: taken over) 
by the communist regime after World War II. But Jan Walter, the earnest and dignified 
superintendent of the Warsaw diocese, concedes that Lutheran schools and hospitals can only 
be revived when and if a major influx of western capital occurs. Walter states, "We have 
a committee here which has attempted for years to initiate new businesses. Such firms could 
then generate the kind of capital we need to rebuild our church institutions . . . .  Three 
generations grew up in the totalitarian system. Old economic structures, in which the 
Lutherans lived, were destroyed. It won't be easy to restore them." Polish Lutherans are 
ardently interested in importing western business and technical know-how through church 
channels, much as the Catholics are already doing. 
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Recently, a Lutheran pastor from Illinois, who was part of a delegation of farmers, took 
the effort to contact Warsaw Lutherans. Both Walter and Barbara Engholc-Narzynska, 
director of the Polish Bible Society and wife of the Lutheran bishop, Janusz Narzynski, 
expressed deep appreciation for the pastor's visit. Mrs. Narzynska's response though went 
far beyond the economic: "There would be a lot of possibilities to increase this relationship: 
maybe from family to family, from child to child, or between partner churches. Living in 
a minority situation, we need strong support from American Lutherans to feel that we have 
some good brothers and sisters in other parts of the world." 
Even matters of nationality have economic overtones in Poland. Though liberal-minded 
German clergy take considerable effort to emphasize that those Poles applying for West 
German citizenship are indeed Germans, the Poles remaining in their nation of birth are 
more suspicious. After all, very many of those who applied for German citizenship in recent 
years did not speak German. Andrzej Hauptman, a Lutheran pastor from Zabrze in 
south-central Poland, states, "It's strange that ten years ago fewer (of my parishioners) 
considered themselves to be Germans than today. Those who have remained in Upper Silesia 
until now had been content with the situation. Otherwise, they would have left long ago. 
The difficult economic situation has given them the idea that they will be given the right 
to emigrate if they regard themselves as Germans." Edward Gierek, the Communist party 
leader deposed in 1 980, put it in more cryptic terms: the Silesians (residents of south-western 
and south-central Poland) "regard themselves to be Poles when times are good, and as 
Germans when times are bad." 
The new German cultural clubs legalized under the Solidarity-run government are being 
regarded by many as a promising ticket to the West, which was hardly the intent of their 
West German creators. Rev. Hauptman regards these clubs to be one factor why "a lot of 
people have rediscovered that their forefathers were Germans." 
The Lutheran churches in Silesia, where 80% of all Polish Lutherans reside, are hit 
hardest by the exodus westward. Hauptman concedes that although his congregation had 
I ,840 members twenty years ago, only 850 remain. Nationally, Poland now boasts 74,000 
Lutherans, down from 220,000 in the late 1940s. Happily, Cieszyn Silesia on the Czech 
border, with over half of all Lutherans, remains a stronghold of pietistic, ethnic Polish 
Lutheranism. Indeed, hilly, picturesque Cieszyn Silesia has been that for centuries. 
Despite grave economic woes, the new government instituted after roundtable talks in 
August 1 989 retains an astounding amount of support. The mild-mannered Zdzislaw Tranda, 
Reformed bishop and president of the Polish Ecumenical Council, claims, "Every previous 
government would have been deposed long ago in the face of such economic duress." 
Engholc-Narzynska regards the national mood to have been at its lowest ebb two years ago. 
4 1  
"We have always been fighting for political freedom. We have that now, and that is why 
people have hope." 
Nostalgia for the best years under Gierek, when Western loans created an artificial 
economic boom, appears minimal. Protestant theology students assured the author that "those 
times were more placid, but they certainly weren't better." The light at the end of the 
tunnel has not yet appeared, but the expectations that it will come into view around the next 
bend remain strong. It is the hope for better times that explains the present gutty endurance 
of the Polish people. 
POLISH LUTHERANS AND CATHOLICS 
At least since the Reformation, non-Catholic Poles have been scourged by the practice 
of combining confession and nationality. Folk wisdom still maintains that the true Pole is 
a Catholic, the Orthodox a Russian, the Lutheran a German, and the Baptist or Methodist 
a North American. The Jew is, or was, a nation-less "cosmopolitan." Death-bed capers, 
whereby life-long Protestants have voluntarily or otherwise received last rights from a 
Catholic priest, are legion. Tranda relishes the story of one dispute which ended in a draw: 
In Kalisz, where a Catholic and a Reformed cemetery adjoin one another, a person lies 
buried straddling both cemeteries. 
Ninety-three percent of all Poles are Catholics, and the present Solidarity-run 
government has the reputation for being a most Catholic one. Rector Jerzy Gryniakow 
assures that although the present government is not a clerical one, the future danger has by 
no means been banned. "That would be a swing from one extreme to another, from red to 
black. We certainly hope that will not happen." Barbara Engholc-Narzynska from the Bible 
society expresses both the good and the bad news: "We now are enjoying great political 
pluralism, but we have not yet experienced confessional pluralism." 
The three church laws passed by the Polish Seym on May 1 7, 1 989, are a classic example 
of Catholic predominance. Negotiations on these laws had begun nine years earlier; they 
were prepared solely by Catholic and Communist government officials. Non-Catholics were 
never given access to them prior to 1 989. In fact, one of them, the law "Regarding the 
Securing of Freedom of Conscience and Faith," needed to be signed by the non-Catholic 
churches less than 48 hours after having initially received the document. Another law, 
which regulates the return of property holdings to the Catholic church, was only shown to 
outside parties after it had been signed. Professor Gryniakow explains: "We're concerned 
about the principle of the matter. One should either make all churches equal or stop talking 
as if they were . . . .  It would be more upright if the government would recognize affairs as 
they were described in the constitution of 192 1 ,  which stated that the Catholic church was 
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'the first among equals.' That was at least being honest." ·According to these laws in their 
present form, only the Catholics can legally demand the return of their property. 
Fortunately, Polish Protestants are not left to their own devices in the struggle against a 
Catholic, clerical state. Bishop Tranda proudly points out that one of the numerous Catholic 
"Clubs of the Intelligentsia" has promised to support Protestant efforts to create or maintain 
a confessional pluralistic state. Indeed, Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a "progressive" 
Catholic, is regarded by Protestant circles as a political ally. 
The undeniable affinity of Polish Lutherans for their German cousins helps to explain 
their thoroughness regarding judicial rights. The jovial Professor Gryniakow responds: "It 
has always been our pride and joy to possess a clear legal relationship with the state. The 
Orthodox (which have 852,000 members!) don't really care whether or not they are officially 
recognized by the state." One should also bear in mind that Polish Lutheranism has 
historically had few allies in its struggle for recognition as a legitimate Polish entity. Until 
the end of World War II, Polish Catholics and German Lutherans were united in their attempt 
to prove that all Lutherans on Polish soil were in reality Germans. As a result of that 
struggle, the Polish Lutheran bishop Juliusz Bursche was arrested by the Germans and died 
in a concentration camp. Lutherans were more than a little pleased that their bishop, 
Janusz Narzynski, was a participant in the top-level roundtable talks last year. Differences 
in tactic remain today. Of the denominations active in the Polish Ecumenical Council, only 
the Lutherans refused last year to sign the church legislation created by the Catholics. Bishop 
Tranda refers in this context to "overly-defensive behavior." "When a (soccer) team only 
plays defensively, then it tends to shoot the ball into its own net." 
In January, two Orthodox churches in Eastern Poland were taken over by Catholic and 
Uniate squatters. In response, the Orthodox metropolitan of Warsaw refused to receive 
Cardinal Glemp, the Primate of Poland. These "Uniate" are Catholic believers who utilize 
the Greek-Orthodox liturgy. Their denomination, which is most active in the Ukraine, was 
forcibly united with Moscow-led Orthodoxy during Stalin's rule. Engholc-Narzynska, who's 
husband has been ill since the Lutheran convention in Curitiba, Brazil, applauded the 
metropolitan's response in an interview. Yet the cautious Bishop Tranda replied otherwise: 
"That was a mistake of the Orthodox. We should speak more with one another. This problem 
is very complex because the Uniates were taken over by the Orthodox in an improper 
manner." Engholc-Narzynska's ire is understandable, for Lutherans have long tangled with 
Catholics over illegally-occupied church buildings. Only last year, the Jesuits agreed to pay 
for a church in Lodz in which they had been squatters for nearly 45 years. Rev. Andrzej 
Hauptman describes a recent case in Legnica (western Poland), in which the local authorities 
made excessive restoration demands, threatening to hand over the church to the Catholics if 
the church's owners did not respond properly. Hauptman admits: "Although the church is 
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much too large for us, we refused to cooperate. We have only 40 'persons there, and the 
church has 3,000 seats, Bu� ."�'e must retain this church i� order ,to prove that the evangelical 
church there had been a very strong one. We might though be willing to rent the building 
to the Catholics." Indeed, Polish Lutherans rarely lack sufficient chapel space. 
The laws passed on May 1 7, 1 989, decreed state neutrality in all matters of religious faith. 
Hopefully, the state will never again interfere in matters strictly religious in nature. It is 
nevertheless noteworthy that Poles regard their recent past in a more relaxed fashion than 
their East German neighbors. The communists retain the office of national president and 
the propaganda placards of a bygone socialist era have not met a violent end. The wind and 
the rain have instead been commissioned to remove them ultimately from the national 
landscape. 
Engholc-Narzynska fears that Poles are ill-prepared to meet the challenges of present-day 
secularism. "We now have a new kind of secularism. The old challenge had been the 
communist state; now it is the Western style of life, the consumer society . . . .  We are doing 
everything to have things, but little in order to be." Will the capitalist utopia succeed where 
Marx and Engels woefully failed--in supplanting widespread, "folk" faith? Perhaps, but only 
if the present capitalist experiment in Poland indeed does flourish. 
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